In this paper, I advance an original view of the structure of space called Infinitesimal Gunk. This view says that every region of space can be further divided and some regions have infinitesimal size, where infinitesimals are understood in the framework of Robinson's (1966) nonstandard analysis. This view, I argue, provides a novel reply to the inconsistency arguments proposed by Arntzenius (2008) and Russell (2008), which have troubled a more familiar gunky approach. Moreover, it has important advantages over the alternative views these authors suggested. Unlike Arntzenius's proposal, it does not introduce regions with no interior. It also has a much richer measure theory than Russell's proposal and does not retreat to mere finite additivity.
points. 1 Although standard, this view leads to many counterintuitive results. For example, intuitively, the size of a region should be the sum of the sizes of its disjoint parts. 2 But according to the standard view, the points have zero size. Thus they cannot add up to a finite size, because zeros always add up to zero.
For another example, according to the standard view, every region of space (except the whole space) has a boundary, and a closed region includes its boundary. Now, suppose that two rigid bodies which occupy closed regions come into perfect contact: there is no gap between them. Under the standard view, we cannot put two closed regions side by side without overlapping and without leaving a gap between them. Thus, to be in perfect contact, the two closed regions must overlap on their boundaries. But the bodies are rigid and impenetrable, so they should not occupy overlapping regions. Therefore, if the standard view is true, two rigid bodies that occupy closed regions cannot come into perfect contact. But perfect contact is intuitively possible. This is called "the contact puzzle."(See Zimmerman 1996 , Artnzenius 2008 and Russell 2008 Due to these problems, a gunky conception of space has been proposed, according to which space cannot be broken down into ultimate parts. That is, every part of space can be further divided, and extensionless points do not exist. Such a conception can be traced back to the ancient Greeks, such as Anaxagoras. 3 Its contemporary development is often associated with A. N. Whitehead (1919 Whitehead ( , 1920 Whitehead ( , 1929 . Under Whitehead's theory, all regions have at least a finite size. So, it avoids the counterintuitive result that an extended region is composed of unextended points. Moreover, the contact puzzle can be avoided by denying the existence of boundaries. Call this approach the finite gunky view ("finite" as opposed to the infinitesimal approach that I shall soon introduce). However, both F. Arntzenius (2008) and J. Russell (2008) pointed out that the finite gunky view, in conjunction with other plausible assumptions, is inconsistent with countable additivity, an attractive measure-theoretic principle. These authors proposed their own solutions, but at the expense of some attractive features of the original view. Arntzenius suggests readmitting boundaries with nonzero measures, even though they are scattered points with no interiors. Finding this proposal unattractive, Russell suggests rejecting countable additivity instead and having merely finite additivity. But the resulting measure theory is impoverished.
However, the finite gunky view is not the only approach to the gunky conception of space: a different approach is to claim that space also has parts of infinitesimal sizes, which can be further divided. It has been argued that such a notion of divisible infinitesimals appeared in the Chrysippean doctrine of space, time and motion (White 1992) . Although it has an ancient origin, such a doctrine was never developed further, due to the alleged obscurity of an infinitesimal size. But the situation has changed since the development of nonstandard analysis by Abraham Robinson (1966) , which gives infinitesimals a rigorous foundation. 4 In this paper, I will develop a gunky view of space, Infinitesimal Gunk, in the framework of nonstandard analysis. Like the finite gunky view, this view implies that every part of space can be further divided, and there are no boundaries. But unlike the finite gunky view, it implies that some parts have infinitesimal sizes. Developing such a view is not straightforward, for novel technical difficulties arise as we turn to nonstandard analysis. Thus part of my goal is to solve these difficulties and present a rigorous and most plausible gunky view in the framework of nonstandard analysis. In addition, I will advance Infinitesimal Gunk as a novel reply to the inconsistency arguments of Arntzenius and Russell.
I will argue that Infinitesimal Gunk has distinctive advantages over the solutions proposed by these authors. Unlike Arntzenius's proposal, it does not need to admit regions without interiors. It also has a much richer measure theory than Russell's proposal. Infinitesimal Gunk also violates countable additivity, but it has attractive measure-theoretic compensations unavailable to Russell's proposal.
Trouble for the Finite Gunky View
Before I present the finite gunky view, I shall first lay out the main ideas of a gunky space without assuming that every region of space has at least a finite size. The intuitive ideas of a gunky space can be put into the following:
Gunky Space. 5 
(Mereology) Every region has a proper part. (Topology)
There are no boundary regions. (Measure theory) Every region has a subregion of a strictly smaller size.
The mereological aspect can be considered the starting point or the core claim of any gunky view of space. Since extensionless points have no proper parts, it follows that there are no points in space. The topological aspect needs some explanation. A boundary of a region is generally lower-dimensional than the region itself: it's like the skin of an apple if we idealize by imagining the skin to have no thickness at all. 6 The requirement that there are no boundaries thus reflects the "gunky" intuition that space has no lower-dimensional parts. This intuition is in a similar spirit to the mereological aspect: just as there are no indivisible points, there are no lines or surfaces in a higher-dimensional space because they cannot be divided along a particular dimension. 7 Finally, the measure-theoretical aspect is also closely associated with the mereological aspect. It follows from the measure-theoretic principle that every region 5 While the notion of gunky space is usually asssociated with only the mereological aspect, I am anticipating a more developed theory. 6 The precise definition of "boundary" in gunky space will be given later. 7 This reason does not apply to boundaries in general, since boundaries such as the fusion of two points in a one-dimensional space can be divided into two points. has a positive measure together with the mereological aspect and some plausible assumptions. 8 The principle that every region has a positive measure is motivated by the consideration that no extended region is entirely composed of unextended ones.
Before getting to the finite gunky view, we need to know a few topological terms.
In standard topology, openness is the only primitive topological notion: a topological space is a set together with some choice of its open subsets (satisfying certain constraints). A closed set is the complement of an open one. The interior of a set is the union of its open subsets-like the flesh of an apple inside its ideally thin skin. The closure of a set is the intersection of the closed sets including it-like a whole apple to its flesh. Further, a set that is identical to the closure of its interior is called regular closed. For instance, consider the real line R (with its standard topology). The singleton of a point is not regular closed, because the closure of its interior is empty.
Similarly, a set that includes an isolated point is not regular closed (e.g. [0, 1] ∪ {2}). Now, every equivalence class of sets of real numbers that differ at most on their boundaries includes exactly one regular closed set. For the finite gunky view, the intuitive idea is that, since boundaries do not exist, every region should correspond to exactly one such equivalence class (except that of the empty set). In that case, every region can be represented by the regular closed set in its corresponding equivalence class. For simplicity, I will henceforth pretend that our space is one-dimensional (most discussion can be carried over to higher-dimensional cases straightforwardly).
In the finite gunky view, we postulate the following principle for gunky space, which will be further strengthened later.
Real Representation. There is a one-to-one correspondence between all regions of space and all non-empty regular closed sets of real numbers such that a region X is a part of a region Y iff X's corresponding set is a 8 More explicitly, we need the following assumptions: (1) Weak Supplementation: if a region x has a proper part y, then x also has a proper part z that is disjoint from y; (2) Finite Additivity: for finitely many regions, the size of their fusion is the sum of the sizes of those regions. subset of Y 's corresponding set. 9 As in standard mereology, other mereological notions can be defined in terms of parthood. For example, two regions overlap iff they share a common part. Two regions are disjoint iff they do not overlap. A region X is a fusion of regions Y s iff each Y is a part of X and every region that overlaps X also overlaps one of Y s.
For any collection of regions, their mereological fusion corresponds to the closure of the union of their corresponding sets because the union of regular closed sets may not be regular closed and the closure of the union is the smallest regular closed set that includes those sets. For example, the fusion of the gunky regions represented by [0, 1/2], [0, 3/4], [0, 7/8]... is not represented by the union of those intervals, namely [0, 1), which is not regular closed, but by its closure [0, 1]. Since every nonempty regular closed set includes a non-empty regular closed set as a proper subset, every region has a proper part-the mereological aspect of gunky space is confirmed. (For brevity, I will henceforth refer to nonempty sets by default unless otherwise specified.)
We can also specify the topology of gunky space. In the standard topological framework, we have "openness" as the primitive notion. However, this framework is inadequate in the case of gunky space. Since we want there to be no boundaries, there should be no distinction between "open" and "closed" regions that differ at most on their boundaries. As Roeper (1997) and other authors suggest, instead of "openness," we can use the binary relation connectedness as a primitive notion. To postulate the topology of gunky space, we strengthen Real Representation by the following clause:
A region X is connected to a region Y iff X's corresponding set intersects Y 's corresponding set. 9 Note that this principle (along with the measure specified later) implies that there are infinite regions of space. Although whether physical space is infinite or not need not to be settled by a gunky view, we postulate infinite regions for convenience. If one wish to have a gunky view of space with only finite regions, one can modify Real Representation easily.
For example, [0, 1] and [1, 2] represent two connected regions since they intersect at 1. Following Russell (2008) , other topological terms can be defined in terms of connectedness. For example, a region X is a boundary of a region Y iff every part of X is connected to both Y and some region disjoint from Y . Intuitively, an apple's (ideally thin) skin is the boundary of the apple because every part of the skin is in contact with both the apple and its surrounding air. It follows that no region is a boundary of any region-thus the topological aspect of gunky space is met (Russell 2008, 7) . Then we can define "openness": a region is open iff it does not overlap any of its boundaries. It follows that every region is open. I will henceforth call topologically strengthened Real Representation together with the measure-theoretic principle that every region has a strictly smaller subregion the finite gunky view.
How should we measure regions? In standard analysis, the Lebesgue measure, which takes value in nonnegative extended real numbers [0, +∞], is the standard way of assigning length, area, volume, and so on to subsets of a real coordinate space.
Given Real Representation, it is natural to assign to a region the Lebesgue measure of its corresponding set. More precisely, we strengthen Real Representation by the following clause:
Lebesgue Gunky Measure. The measure of any region is equal to the Lebesgue measure of its corresponding set.
We can check that every region indeed has a subregion of a strictly smaller size.
However, Arntzenius (2008) shows that this measure is not countably additive.
Countable Additivity. For any countably many disjoint regions, their fusion has a measure, which is the sum of the measures of those regions. 10 The inconsistency argument runs as follows. Consider a unit closed interval of real numbers. Take the middle closed interval of length 1/4. Then take the middle intervals of length 1/16 from both of the remaining intervals. Repeat the same process ad infinitum. In the i-th step, each middle interval we take is 1/4 i -inch long. Label those intervals A 1 , B 1 , B 2 , C 1 , ... such that the same letters refer to intervals of the same lengths. The intervals taken in the first three steps are illustrated below :
Call the intervals the Cantor intervals and their union the Cantor union. A point is a limit point of a set iff any open set including that point intersects that set. The closure of a set is the union of this set and all its limit points. We have that every point in the unit interval either belongs to the Cantor union or is a limit point of it.
Thus, the closure of the Cantor union is the whole unit interval. Now, each Cantor interval represents a gunky region. Call those regions the Cantor regions. It follows from Real Representation that the fusion of the Cantor regions is represented by the closure of the Cantor union, which is the whole unit interval. Thus, the Lebesgue gunky measure of the fusion is one. However, the Cantor regions that compose the fusion respectively measure 1/4, 1/16 · 2, 1/64 · 4,..., which sum up to 1/2. Suppose the measure theory is countably additive. Then the measure of the fusion is 1/2. It follows that the measure of the fusion of the Cantor regions is both 1 and 1/2. So, Lebesgue Gunky Measure is not countably additive.
What's worse, Russell (2008) apple-shaped open set in R 3 is the union of many cubes. In standard topology, a topological space typically has a countable basis, that is, a basis with only countably many basis elements. For instance, one basis for the standard topology of the real line is the set of all open intervals with rational numbers as endpoints, which are countably many. Russell argued that, like a real coordinate space, our space has a countable basis.
Countable Basis. The topology of space has a countable basis.
Russell has shown that the finite gunky view, if it satisfies Countable Basis and some standard mereological assumptions, is inconsistent with Countable Additivity (Russell 2008, 9) . 12 12 The main mereological assumption is Remainder Closure, the principle that unless a region we should check if there is a better alternative. 13 Russell suggested that we should deny Countable Additivity and retreat to merely finitely additive measure. Under this suggestion, the measure of any region is equal to the Jordan measure of its corresponding set (a restriction of the Lebesgue measure that is merely finitely additive). But the resulting measure theory is rather impoverished (which I discuss in Section 5). Is there another way out? Infinitesimal Gunk, the non-standard theory of space that I shall develop in Section 3, will provide a novel reply to the inconsistency arguments. In particular, Countable Basis fails, but without the costs that Russell assumed (Section 4). Although this theory also violates Countable Additivity, it satisfies a weaker version of it and has a much richer measure theory than Russell's proposal (Section 5). The theory is also immune to the variants of Arntzenius's argument (Section 6).
X is proper part of a region Y , X has a part that is the remainder of Y in X (or the mereological difference X − Y ). (Russell 2008, 4) 13 In this paper, I do not discuss why this feature of Arntzenius's theory is undesirable. I simply assume that it is intuitively attractive for a gunky space to have no boundaries (see Russell 2008 ).
The core idea of Infinitesimal Gunk is that, instead of representing a gunky region by a set of real numbers, we represent a region by an extended set of numbers provided by nonstandard analysis (NSA). In NSA, we can extend the real line R to the hyperreal line * R, which includes infinitesimals and infinite numbers, along with the familiar real numbers. 14 A number is infinitesimal iff its absolute value is smaller than any positive real number. A number is infinite iff its absolute value is larger than any positive real number. On the hyperreal line, each real number is surrounded by a "cloud" of hyperreal numbers that are infinitesimally close to it, called its monad.
The monads of different real numbers do not overlap. Moreover, we can do arithmetic on the hyperreal numbers just like on the standard real numbers. For example, for any positive infinitesimal δ and any infinite number N , we have Hyperreal Representation. There is a one-to-one correspondence between all regions of space and all non-empty regular closed sets of hyperreal numbers such that a region X is a part of a region Y iff X's corresponding set is a subset of Y 's corresponding set. 15 As a basic example, the hyperreal interval [0, 1] is regular closed and thus represents a region. The set of all infinitesimals-and in general each monad-is regular closed, and thus represents a region. Furthermore, the countable union of [1/2, 1], [1/4, 1], ..., [1/2 n , 1], ... is also regular closed and represents a region.
We need to define a topology for gunky space so that there are indeed no boundary regions. Like in the finite gunky view, I will follow Roeper (1997) in using connectedness as the primitive notion. But the difficulty here is that we cannot postulate the connectedness relation between gunky regions in Infinitesimal Gunk in the same way as in the case of the finite gunky view. Recall that, in the finite gunky view, we postulate that two regions are connected iff their representative sets have a nonempty intersection. But this will not do the trick in Infinitesimal Gunk, because every monad represents a region, and distinct monads have no elements in common.
If we postulate connectedness in the same way, then every region represented by a monad would be disconnected from the region represented by its complement on the hyperreal line. 16 This feature would be bad for our theory-for we want to describe a continuous space, which is composed of regions connected with each other.
To solve this "disconnection" problem, I propose an alternative to Roeper's postulation of connectedness between gunky regions. The intuitive idea is that two regions are connected iff they each contain a part such that there is no "gap" between them.
For any two sets A, B, let "A ≤ B" mean that for any x ∈ A and any y ∈ B, we have x ≤ y. Similarly, for any set A and any point z, let "A ≤ z," for example, mean that for any x ∈ A we have x ≤ z. Then, the relation of connectedness satisfies the following principle:
Connectedness. Two regions represented by sets A and B are connected iff there is a subset A of A and a subset B of B such that either (1)
It immediately follows from this definition that a region represented by a monad is indeed connected with the region represented by the complement of the monad on the hyperreal line. Under this definition, connectedness is reflexive, symmetric, and monotonic-the three features that constitute what Russel calls "core topology" (Russell 2016, 262). In addition, connectedness is distributive. Together, these features are essentially what Roeper took to be the "central characteristics" of connectedness (Roeper 1997, 255) . 18 Let X, Y, Z range over all regions: 16 Indeed, the interval topology itself has this problem: under the definition of connectedness in standard topology, every monad is disconnected from the rest of the hyperreal line. 17 In higher-dimensional space-informally speaking-two regions are connected iff they each contain a part such that there is no hyperreal hypersurface between their corresponding sets. 18 A small complication is that Roeper's core axioms for connectedness assume the existence of the null region, while I assume there is no null region, which would require some small changes in the formalism.
It is worth noting that my stipulation of connectedness does not satisfy all of Roeper's axioms beyond the core axioms. In particular, with any reasonable definition of another primitive notion limitedness in Roeper's axioms, Infinitesimal Gunk would violate the following axiom (a region X is well inside a region Y iff X is not connected to Y 's complement):
Reflexivity. X is connected to itself.
Distributivity. If X is connected to the fusion of Y and Z, then X is either connected to Y or to Z.
I shall explain why Distributivity holds, since it's relatively less obvious. Take two arbitrary regions represented by sets B and C. First, we note that the union of any two regular closed sets is still regular closed. Thus, the fusion of the two regions is represented by the union of B and C. Suppose a region represented by set A is connected to the fusion of those two regions. According to Connectedness, there
that there are no separating points between A and B ∪ C . 19 It follows that either there are no separating points between A and B or there are no separating points A10. If A is a limited region, B is not the null region, and A is well inside B, then there is a limited region C such that A is well inside C and C is well inside B. (Roeper 1997, 256) In whatever way we define limitedness, it is reasonable to assume that at least the hyperreal interval [0, 1] is limited. In the following sketch of a counterexample to A10, I will use Roeper's axiom that every part of a limited region is limited. A10 can fail for some infinite fusion of infinitesimal intervals. Let be an infinitesimal. Let A be represented by the union of all intervals [4n , (4n + 1) ] for all hypernatural n such that n is an infinitesimal. Let B be represented by the union of slightly larger intervals [(4n − 1) , (4n + 2) ] (with the same restriction on n) together with the set of all non-infinitesimal numbers. Note that A is entirely contained in the monad of zero and thus limited, and it is well inside B. But there is no region C that satisfies A10. Call a region snuggly iff its representing set contains arbitrarily small positive non-infinitesimal numbers. It can be straightforwardly checked that, for any region C, if A is well inside C, then C is snuggly. But if C is snuggly, then C is connected with B's complement. So A10 must be violated.
One main role of Roeper's axioms is to ensure that there is a one-to-one correspondence between gunky topologies (or "region-based topologies" in Roeper's term) and locally compact Hausdorff spaces under standard point-set topology. As a result of the violation of A10, we cannot recover a locally compact Hausdorff space from Infinitesimal Gunk through Roeper's correspondence (see Roeper 1997, 276, 278-9) . This is not terribly surprising because the interval topology of the hyperreal line is not locally compact.
between A and C , for otherwise at least one of them would separate A and B ∪ C .
For example, if A ≤ B ∪ C , then whichever of a separating point between A and B and one between A and C is smaller, it would separate A and B ∪ C . So A is either connected to B or to C.
As in the finite gunky view, other topological terms are defined in terms of connectedness. It follows from Connectedness that no region is a boundary of any region. Recall that a region X is a boundary of a region Y iff every part of X is connected to both Y and some region disjoint from Y . Suppose there is such a boundary region. Then it is represented by some regular closed set. The intuitive idea is that a regular closed set is "fat" enough that we can always find a regular closed set strictly inside it. This smaller regular closed set represents a region that is disconnected from any region disjoint from the boundary region. This contradicts the definition of boundary, so there are no boundaries. It follows that the condition for openness is trivially satisfied, which means that every region is open. Also, every region is closed because every region has a complement (which is open). The closure of a region is always itself.
Next, I shall postulate a measure over regions. Like in Lebesgue Gunky Measure, I will equate the measure of a region to the measure of its representing set.
But first of all I shall propose a measure on the hyperreal line. The measure will be non-standard in the following senses. Instead of assigning nonnegative extended real numbers to subsets of a space, it assigns nonnegative hyperreal measures to certain hyperreal sets. Also, unlike standard measure theory, the measurable sets are not closed under countable union, which I will discuss more in Section 5. 20 Similar to the construction of the Lebesgue measure on the real line, we first define the measure of a hyperreal interval: 20 The measure I introduce here is similar to the "proto-measure" introduced in Goldblatt (1998, 207) . However, Goldblatt did not consider it a measure precisely because the measurable sets are not closed under countable union. He instead used it to define an extended-real-valued measure Loeb measure which satisfies this requirement.
Interval Length. For a hyperreal interval with end points a, b, its measure is |b − a|.
Notice that the measure of an interval can be infinitesimal.
Next, we define the length of the hyperreal set that is a union of such intervals.
But before that, I shall first explain the notion of hyperfinite sum in NSA. First, notice the following fact: for any countably infinitely many items, even if they have an infinite sum (i.e., the limit of partial sums) in standard analysis, they generally do not have an infinite sum in NSA, because the partial sums do not converge to a unique hyperreal number. For instance, the partial sums 1/2 + 1/4 + ... However, there is a special kind of infinite "cardinality," and accordingly a special kind of infinite sum in NSA. Recall that the set of all hyperreal numbers is an extension of the set of all real numbers. In the same sense, the set of all natural numbers can be extended to the set of hypernatural numbers, which obey the same first-order truths of standard analysis as the natural numbers. Just as any real number is smaller than some natural number, any hyperreal number is smaller than some hypernatural number. Since there are infinite hyperreal numbers, it follows that there are also infinite hypernatural numbers. Let N be a hypernatural number. In NSA, there is a distinct notion of "cardinality"-call it hyperfinite cardinality-that assigns N to {1, 2, ..., N }, just as the finite set {1, 2, ..., n}(n ∈ N) has a cardinality of n. A 21 There are two ways of defining "converge" here. First, we can say that the partial sums 1/2 + 1/4 + ... + 1/2 n converge to a hyperreal number h, if their difference can be made smaller than any particular real number by making n sufficiently large. Second, we can define "converge" in a non-standard way: the partial sums 1/2 + 1/4 + ... + 1/2 n converge to a hyperreal number h, if their difference can be made smaller than any particular hyperreal number by making n sufficiently large. Under the first definition, the partial sums in question converge to many different hyperreal numbers. Under the second definition, the partial sums in question do not converge to any hyperreal number. Either way, there is no unique hyperreal number that the partial sums converge to. hyperfinite set is either finite or else continuum-sized. Furthermore, just as in standard analysis the sum of a finite sequence of real numbers is well-defined, in NSA, the sum of a hyperfinite sequence of hyperreal numbers is well-defined. This is called the hyperfinite sum. Note though, hyperfiniteness is different from finiteness when it comes to higher-order claims: for example, a subset of a hyperfinite set need not be hyperfinite. 22 (For more on "hyperfinite cardinality" and "hyperfinite sum," see Goldblatt 1998, 178-81.) For any hyperreal set, if we can list the disjoint intervals it includes in a hyperfinite sequence, then its measure is the hyperfinite sum of the measures of those intervals. 23
Hyperreal Measure. For any hyperreal set, if it is a union of hyperfinitely many disjoint hyperreal intervals, then its measure is the sum of the measures of those intervals. Otherwise, its measure is undefined.
Such a measure is well-defined because, like in the finite case, different decompositions of a hyperreal set into hyperfinitely many disjoint intervals (if possible) lead to the same measure. 24 Since every measurable set is a union of hyperfinitely many disjoint intervals, and because hyperfinite summation is associative like in the finite case, it follows that for hyperfinitely many disjoint measurable sets, the measure of their union is the sum of the measures of those sets.
Hyperfinite Additivity (set). For hyperfinitely many disjoint measurable sets, the measure of their union is the sum of the measures of those sets. 22 A subset of a hyperfinite set can be countably infinite, but no countably infinite set is hyperfinite. 23 A hyperfinite sequence is an internal bijection from {1, 2, ..., N }, for some hypernatural N . An internal function is a function that is expressible in the language of standard analysis. (Appendix A; see also Goldblatt 1998 , 172-5 for more detail.) 24 That is, like in the finite case, it is true in nonstandard analysis that for any hyperfinitely many disjoint hyperreal intervals B 1 , B 2 , ..., B N and C 1 , C 2 , ..., C M (N, M are hypernaturals), if the union of all B i is the same as the union of all C j , then the hyperfinite sum of the measures of all B i is equal to the hyperfinite sum of the measures of all C j . Note that the language of standard analysis quantifies over sets as well as numbers, and these quantifiers also receive nonstandard internal interpretation in the hyperreal system (Goldblatt 1998, 168-170) .
The hyperreal measure approximates the Lebesgue measure over the real line in the following sense. Recall that any finite hyperreal number is infinitely close to exactly one real number. The real number is called the shadow of the hyperreal number. Let the shadow of any infinite positive hyperreal number be the extended real number +∞. Let the shadow of a set be the set of the shadows of its members.
Then, we have the following theorem:
Lebesgue Approximation. For any measurable hyperreal set, the shadow of its measure is the Lebesgue measure of its shadow (Goldblatt 1998, 215-7) .
In other words, the measure of a hyperreal set, if well-defined, is infinitesimally close to the Lebesgue measure of its shadow on the real line.
Notice that some hyperreal sets, including some regular closed ones, are not mea- 25 A hyperreal number can be considered as an equivalence class of infinite sequences of real numbers that agree on "almost" every position (which is defined through an ultrafilter). (Goldblatt, 1998) Denying Countable Basis in standard topology may result in "exotic," illbehaved spaces because it is associated with other desirable topological features of a space. For example, it is typically associated with metrizability. A topological space is metrizable iff we can define a real-valued distance between any two points such that the set of open balls with any radius are a basis for the topology. A metric space, which is of special interest in physics and mathematics, is a metrizable space together with a specific distance function. Every space with a countable basis is metrizable.
Although the converse is not true in general, many commonly studied metrizable spaces have a countable basis. 26 So we typically require a space to have a countable basis to ensure that it is metrizable.
What hyperreal space shows is that it's not obvious that our physical space is metrizable, for it is completely natural to have a hyperreal-valued distance function, rather than a real-valued one. Let's call the corresponding notion hypermetrizability.
Unlike metrizable spaces, it is not typical for a hypermetrizable space to have a countable basis-after all, a hyperreal space with the interval topology does not have a countable basis but is nevertheless hypermetrizable. For any two points on the hyperreal line a, b, we can define the distance between them to be |b − a|, which is the same as the length of the interval (a, b). These open intervals constitute a basis for the interval topology of the hyperreal line. 27 26 Some rather unusual metric spaces do not have a countable basis. For example, consider any uncountable set. Let the distance between any two distinct elements be one. Then it generates a topology that does not have a countable basis (because for each element, its singleton is open). But such a distance function is not very interesting.
27 Higher-dimensional cases are similar. For any two points in a hyperreal coordinate space p = (p 1 , p 2 , ...), q = (q 1 , q 2 , ...), we can define the Euclidean distance between them, i.e., d(p, q) = (p 1 − q 1 ) 2 + (p 2 − q 2 ) 2 + ... Then, all open balls constitute a basis for the interval topology of that hyperreal space.
I will now illustrate some desirable features of the measure in Infinitesimal Gunk by comparing it with the measure in Russell's solution. To avoid the inconsistency, Russell suggested rejecting Countable Additivity and using a merely finitely additive measure, such as the Jordan measure. Recall that in Arntzenius's inconsistency argument, Countable Additivity entails that the fusion of the Cantor regions has a measure of 1/2, but this fusion is represented by the unit interval, which has measure one. By rejecting Countable Additivity, Russell was able to claim that the fusion simply has measure one. To motivate this strategy, Russell argued that while finite additivity is necessary for understanding what a measure is, Countable Additivity need not be built into the nature of a measure. However, adopting a merely finitely additive measure has many drawbacks.
To start with, it violates an attractive principle of supervenience: for countably many disjoint measurable regions, the measure of their fusion (or whether there is one) is completely determined by the measures of those regions. That is, for any countably many disjoint measurable regions, no rearrangement will change the measure of their fusion (or whether their fusion has a measure). To put it more precisely:
Countable Supervenience. For any two countable sets A, B of disjoint measurable regions, if there is a measure-preserving bijection from A to B, then if the fusion of A is measurable, the fusion of B is measurable and has the same measure as the fusion of A.
Russell's solution violates this principle. For instance, if you first walked 1/4 mile, and then 1/16 mile twice, and then 1/64 mile four times, and so on, in a straight line, then the total distance you walked is a half-mile. But when regions of these same sizes happen to be arranged like the Cantor intervals, the total distance becomes one mile. Thus, the measure of the fusion of countably many disjoint regions is not deter-mined by the measures of those regions. This seems magical. Now, many people have argued that this violation is no more magical than the violation of supervenience in the uncountable case in the standard view, according to which the length of a line segment does not supervene on the length of its constituent points (for example, see Hawthorne and Weatherson 2004) . Thus, although the violation of Countable Supervenience may be technically inconvenient, it is philosophically no worse than the violation of uncountable supervenience, or the failure of arbitrary supervenience.
But it is not obvious whether all motivations behind Countable Supervenience
will generalize to all cases. 28 In standard mathematics, the countable case is usually more well-behaved than the uncountable case, so the countable case may be of special interest. In general, I will take it as an advantage to satisfy We can assign to Big Fusion any value between its inner measure of 1/3 and its outer measure of 5/6, and to Small fusion any value between its inner measure of 1/6 and its outer measure of 2/3, as long as the sum of the two values add up to one (Russell 2008, 20-1) . But these suggestions have clear drawbacks. If we consider those regions to be unmeasurable (without anything more to say), then the measure theory would be very restricted. But if those regions have measures, then the measure theory would involve many brute facts that are wildly different from their equally good alternatives.
The situation for Infinitesimal Gunk is subtle. On the one hand, like Russell's solution, Infinitesimal Gunk also violates Countable Additivity. For example, suppose you are walking a straight line, and you first walked 1/2 mile, then 1/4 mile, then 1/8 mile, and so on for all natural numbers. How many miles have you walked in total? It's not one mile because the monad at the end of the one mile is not included in your journey. Indeed it's unmeasurable because the monad is not measurable. In fact, we can prove that for any countably infinitely many disjoint measurable regions, their fusion is unmeasurable. It takes two steps to prove this claim. First, for any countably infinitely many disjoint measurable hyperreal sets, their union is unmeasurable (see Appendix A.5 for my proof based on countable saturation). Second, for any countably many disjoint regular closed sets, their union is regular closed (which, as I show in Appendix A.6, also follows from countable saturation). Since measurable regions are represented by measurable regular closed sets, it follows that for any countably infinitely many disjoint measurable regions, their fusion is always unmeasurable.
On the other hand, this very result entails that Infinitesimal Gunk satisfies Countable Supervenience, since the fusion of countably infinitely many disjoint measurable regions is always unmeasurable no matter how those regions are arranged.
Thus, unlike in Russell's proposal, for countably many disjoint regions, the magic of changing the measure of their fusion (or whether there is a measure) through mere rearrangements of those regions does not occur. 29
However, one may argue that, even though Countable Supervenience is satisfied, the mere fact that no fusion of countably infinitely many disjoint measurable regions has a measure is a serious cost to the theory. This may be true. However, what makes the measure theory of Infinitesimal Gunk attractive is that it has important compensations unavailable to Russell's proposal: the measure theory satisfies Hyperfinite Additivity, and we can define an extended-real-valued approximate measure that satisfies Countable Additivity. I will explain them in turn.
First, unlike Russell's solution, the measure theory does not retreat to mere finite additivity. Rather, it has hyperfinite additivity as a compensation.
Hyperfinite Additivity. For hyperfinitely many disjoint measurable regions, their fusion has a measure, which is the (hyperfinite) sum of the measures of those regions.
This follows from Hyperfinite Additivity (Set) in Section 3. 30 As a result, Infinitesimal Gunk has a much richer measure than Russell's solution.
To make this richness more vivid, consider *Big Fusion, defined as the hyperreal extension of Big Fusion (that is, the fusion of the regions represented by the hyperreal extensions of A 1 , C 1 , C 2 , ...). 31 What is the measure of *Big Fusion? Infinitesimal Gunk implies that it is unmeasurable. But this is not all it says. The hyperreal measure satisfies the following theorem: Lebesgue completion, then it has an approximate measure, which is equal to the measure of that completion.
Since *Big Fusion has a shadow that has a Lebesgue measure of 1/3, it has a Lebesgue completion that measures 1/3. This means that, even though *Big Fusion is unmeasurable, it has an approximate measure of 1/3. These approximate measures have nice properties. Notably, they satisfy Countable Additivity. 32 The qualification of being "proper" and having a Lebesgue measurable shadow corresponds to Loeb-measurablity (see Goldblatt 1998, 215-7) . Then Measure Approximation follows from Goldblatt (1998, 212-4) . Roughly, the set of Loeb-measurable sets is like the set of hyperrealmeasurable sets except that it has more members so that it is closed under countable unions. The claims to follow in the main text hold under this qualification. In particular, the set representing *Big Fusion is Loeb-measurable.
Approximate Countable Additivity. For any countably many disjoint regions that have approximate measures, their fusion also has an approximate measure, which is equal to the sum of the approximate measures of those regions. 33 (Goldblatt 1998, 206-8, 212-4) In comparison, in Russell's solution, no such attractive approximate measure can be systematically assigned. It is reasonable to assume that, under Russell's proposal, the approximate measure of a Jordan-measurable region is just its Jordan measure. Then, assuming Approximate Countable Additivity, the approximate measure of Big Countable Basis without also giving up Countable Additivity? Given some reasonable assumptions, the answer is no: there is no such theory. 34 Here's a brief sketch as for why. If space does not have a countable basis, it would follow (under some reasonable assumptions) that there exist some very small regions that do not have any rational interval as a part. Moreover, assuming measure is translation- 33 The notion of approximate measure amounts to the Loeb measure, which is countably additive (Goldblatt 1998, 206-8 ; see also Footnote 32). Given that the Loeb measure is countably additive, it is natural to wonder why we do not use the Loeb measure instead of the hyperreal measure that I define in the paper. The main reason is that under the Loeb measure, all infinitesimal regions have zero measure. This violates the principle that every region has a strictly smaller subregion, which is one of the main intuitions behind the gunky approach to space. 34 Without any constraint, it is possible to violate Countable Basis without violating Countable Additivity, but this requires topological spaces that are too exotic to be a candidate for our actual physical space. A typical example is the product space [0, 1] I with product topology, where I is a cardinality larger than continuumly many. It does not have a countable basis, but has a countably additive measure.
invariant, we can find countably infinitely many disjoint such regions with the same size within a unit interval. Those regions cannot all have positive finite measures. able Additivity under certain reasonable assumptions including that every region has a smaller subregion and measure is translation-invariant. As usual, I will pretend our space is "onedimensional" in any suitable sense. The additional assumptions that the proof replies on are labeled in parentheses.
Proof. Suppose space does not have a countable basis, and furthermore, the set of all measurable regions does not have a countable basis (although this supposition is stronger than the violation of Countable Basis, Russell's inconsistency proof effectively only involves the thesis that the set of all measurable regions has a countable basis). Also, suppose space is one-dimensional in the sense that its topology can be generated by some intervals (Assumption-1). In particular, we assume that every interval can be characterized by two endpoints, and that all endpoints are abstract entities that constitute a totally ordered Abelian group, to which rational numbers can be embedded. The set of all intervals with rational endpoints (or "rational intervals" for short) cannot be a basis since they are only countably many. As one can check, it follows that there is an interval ( , δ) that do not have any rational interval as a part and therefore δ − is smaller than any rational number. Suppose measure is translation-invariant (Assumption-2). Then we can find countably infinitely many disjoint regions with the same measure as ( , δ) within the interval (0, 1). For example, let ∆ = δ − , and let I n = ( 1 n − ∆, 1 n ) for all n ∈ N. Assuming Countable Additivity, the measure of the fusion of I n for all n ∈ N is well-defined-call this fusion "Big." Now, consider the fusion of I n for all n ≥ 2, and call this fusion "Small." Then, given Countable Supervenience (which is entailed by Countable Additivity), Small has the same measure as Big. We further assume that for any two bounded regions, their measures have a well-defined subtraction (Assumption-3). Since Big is the fusion of the two disjoint regions I 1 and Small, it follows from finite additivity that I 1 has a measure of zero. This contradicts the principle that every region has a strictly smaller subregion (Assumption-4), which captures the measure-theoretic aspect of gunky space. Therefore, given the listed assumptions, it is impossible to violate Countable Basis without violating Countable Additivity. QED Recall that Arntzenius's inconsistency argument relies on the following fact:
Cantor Closure. The closure of the Cantor union is the unit real interval.
In the case of the hyperreal line, the analogous claim would be: Can we come up with a different construction from *Cantor that gives rise to similar problems as in Arntzenius's argument? One observation is that there is no analogous claim to *Cantor Closure as long as such a construction is composed of countably many intervals.
Countable Union. The union of countably many disjoint closed intervals is regular closed.
Again, the idea is that infinitesimals are so small that for any point outside the countably many disjoint closed intervals, we can find an infinitesimally small neighborhood of that point disjoint from the union of those intervals. As a result, any point outside the union is not a limit point of it (Appendix A.6).
A perhaps cleverer revision of the argument is that, rather than cutting out countably many hyperreal intervals from the line segment, we cut out a much larger set of intervals. A countable set is in one-to-one correspondence with the set of all natural numbers. Analogously, let a hypercountable set be in one-to-one (internal) correspondence with the set of all hypernatural numbers. The idea then is to cut out hypercountably many hyperreal intervals from the line segment: R 1 , R 2 , ...R N , R N +1 , ..., with N being some infinite hypernatural. Call the union of these intervals Hypercantor. In this case, every point outside Hypercantor is a limit point of it, because for any such point, its neighborhood-even if infinitesimally small-always intersects Hypercantor. 36 Consequently, the closure of Hypercantor is the whole line segment! 36 The reason for this is analogous to the reason why every point outside the Cantor union is a limit of the Cantor union. In the case of the Cantor union, for any point x in the unit interval, for any positive real number , we can find a point y in the Cantor union such that |y − x| < . Now, Hypercantor is constructed in the same way as the Cantor union, except that the cutting process does not stop with countably many intervals but continues for hypercountably many more. In particular, the Hypercantor intervals can be expressed in terms of when they are cut out in the same way as the Cantor intervals. For example, the leftmost point of the Hypercantor intervals cut out at stage N is 1/2 N +1 + 1/2 2N +1 , just like the leftmost point of the Cantor intervals cut out at stage n is 1/2 n+1 + 1/2 2n+1 . Thus, for instance, 0 is a limit point of Hypercantor because for any positive hyperreal δ, we can find a hypernatural N such that 1/2 N +1 + 1/2 2N +1 < δ. This reasoning can be generalized to all the points on the unit hyperreal interval.
But this does not cause trouble for Infinitesimal Gunk, because Hypercantor is not a union of hyperfinitely many hyperreal intervals. 37 We can grant that the gunky region represented by the unit hyperreal interval is the fusion of hypercountably More generally, we can prove that any union of disjoint regular closed measurable sets that is not identical to its closure must be unmeasurable.
Hyperfinite Union. The union of hyperfinitely many disjoint measurable regular closed sets is regular closed. 38
Moreover, any measurable regular closed set is the union of hyperfinitely many disjoint measurable regular closed sets (in particular, closed hyperreal intervals). It follows that any union of disjoint regular closed sets that is not regular closed is unmeasurable.
As a result, Infinitesimal Gunk is safe from any Arntzenius-style trouble, since a union of regular closed sets that is not identical to their closures is unmeasurable and thus does not cause trouble, just like what we saw in the case of Hypercantor.
Conclusion
Can space be divided into ultimate parts? Does space have parts with infinitesimal sizes? These questions are more related to each other than they seem to be. In this 37 There is no internal bijection between a hypercountable set and a hyperfinite set. 38 This claim is an extension of the claim that the union of finitely many regular closed sets is regular. See Appendix A.7 for my proof sketch.
paper, I have shown that Infinitesimal Gunk, the view that any region of space can be further divided and some regions are infinitesimally small, provides a novel reply to the inconsistency arguments given by Arntzenius and Russell. Moreover, this view has several important advantages over the solutions these authors suggested. It has a richer measure theory than Russell's proposal and satisfies attractive measuretheoretic principles unavailable to the latter. Unlike Arntzenius's proposal, it does not need to admit boundaries. Thus I recommend this novel theory for serious consideration.
A Countable Saturation
The language of standard analysis L that we focus on includes constant symbols for all real numbers and set constructions from real numbers through the iterations of the powerset operation and union. More precisely, let U n (X) = U n−1 (X) ∪ P(U n−1 (X)) and U (X) = ∞ n=0 U n (X). The language includes constants for all members of U (R), which have associated ranks according to the least U n (R) they belong. L-terms and L-formulas are defined in the usual way (Goldblatt 1998, 166-7) . We can show that all the familiar functions and relations in standard analysis (such as addition, integration, Lebesgue measure), considered as sets, are members of U (R) and therefore are referred to by L-constants (Goldblatt 1998, 165-6) . Note that these functions and relations are not just defined over real numbers but can have a variety of ranks. The hyperreal system under consideration (along with the set constructions) U is an alternative model for L that is an expansion of U (R). There is a unique transfer map from U (R)
to U that preserves all the L-truths. Members of the image of the transfer map are called standard. For example, the hyperreal line * R is the image of R under the transfer map, and is therefore standard. An entity is internal iff it is a member of a standard set (Goldblatt 1998, 172) . Any hyperreal number is internal because it is a member of * R. Any hyperreal interval is internal because it is a member of the where φ is a formula in the language L that extends L with constants for internal entities, are internal sets (Goldblatt 1998, 177) . For example, L has constants for all hyperreal numbers. A hyperreal interval {x | a ≤ x ≤ b} (a, b ∈ * R) is therefore internal. On the other hand, we can prove that any infinite set of real numbers (e.g., R, N) is not internal (Goldblatt 1998, 176) .
In the hyperreal models we are interested in, the internal sets satisfy the following property:
Theorem A.1 (Countable Saturation) The intersection of a decreasing sequence of nonempty internal sets X 1 ⊇ X 2 ⊇ ... is always nonempty (Goldblatt 1998, 138) .
Countable Saturation implies this principle: Proof. In this proof, we will use this fact: if a set of regions B is a basis for a gunky space, then every region in that space contains some region in B. Let C be any countable set of regions. Take an arbitrary point x on the hyperreal line, and consider the set of all elements in C that include x in their interiors. Call this set C x . Since C is countable, C x is also countable. It follows from Nested Intervals that there exists an infinitesimal neighborhood ∆ of x that is included in all elements of C x . Take a closed infinitesimal interval that is strictly included in ∆. This interval does not contain any element of C, so C is not a basis. Thus, a gunky space does not have a countable basis. QED.
In Section 5 (p.23), I mentioned that the fusion of any countably infinitely many disjoint measurable regions is not measurable. This claim can be derived from the following corollaries of Countable Saturation: Corollary A.4 If an internal set X is a countable union of internal sets X 1 , X 2 , ..., then there is a natural number k such that X is the union of X 1 , ..., X k (Goldblatt 1998, 139) .
Proof. The proof is adpated from Goldblatt (1998, 139-40) . Suppose that for all k ∈ N, X − n≤k X n is non-empty. Since X − n≤k X n = n≤k (X − X n ), we have that n≤k (X −X n ) is non-empty. Call this set Y k . Then Y k is a decreasing sequence of non-empty internal sets. So, by Countable Saturation, there is a point belonging to Y k for all k, and thus to X − X k for all k. Therefore, X is not the union of X 1 , X 2 , ....
QED.
Corollary A.5 For any countably infinitely many disjoint measurable sets, their union is unmeasurable.
Proof. Every measurable set is a union of hyperfinitely many disjoint intervals. This in fact guarantees that it is an internal set. Let A 1 , A 2 , ... be countably infinitely many disjoint measurable sets and let A be their union. Suppose A is measurable.
According to Corollary B.4, it follows that A is the union of finitely many A i . But since A 1 , A 2 , ... are infinitely many and disjoint, their union is not identical to the union of any finitely many A i . Thus, A is not measurable. QED.
Corollary A.6 For any countably many disjoint regular closed sets, their union is regular closed.
Proof. Let A 1 , A 2 , ... be countably many disjoint regular closed sets on the hyperreal line. Let A be their union. I will show that A includes all its limit points and is therefore closed. Take any point y outside A. For each regular closed set A j , there is an open interval that includes y and is disjoint from A j . According to Nested Intervals, the intersection of these open intervals includes an open interval which includes y and is disjoint from A. Thus y is not a limit point of A. Since y is arbitrarily chosen, no point outside A is a limit point. Therefore, A is closed. QED.
In Section 6 (p.30), we need to show that there are no "trouble-making" boundaries when it comes to the union of hyperfinitely many regular closed sets.
Theorem A.7 For any hyperfinitely many measurable regular closed sets, their union is regular closed.
Proof Sketch. In standard analysis, we have the following induction principle for the natural numbers: an L-formula φ with one free variable is satisfied by every natural number (taken as 1, 2, ...) if (1) φ is satisfied by n = 1; (2) if φ is satisfied by any natural number n, then it is also satisfied by n + 1. In nonstandard analysis, we have an analogous induction principle for the hypernatural numbers: an L-formula ψ with one free variable is satisfied by every hypernatural number if (1) ψ is satisfied by N = 1; (2) if ψ is satisfied by any hypernatural number N , then it is also satisfied by N +1. Since any set with a hyperfinite cardinality N can be ordered under an internal bijection to {1, 2, ..., N }, we will pick any such ordering of the set of hyperfinitely many measurable regular closed sets in question. Now, we can easily confirm the following: (1) the union of the singleton set of a measurable regular closed set is (trivially) regular closed; (2) if the union of the first N measurable regular closed sets is regular closed, then the union of the first N + 1 measurable regular closed sets is also regular closed because the union of two regular closed sets is regular closed. Also, these expressions can indeed be put into L-formulas. Then according to the induction principle, for any hypernatural N , the union of the first N measurable regular closed sets is regular closed, which is just what we want. QED.
